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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF TENTH
CIRCUIT DECISIONS
I. UNITED STATES V. CRONIC: SUPREME COURT REJECTS TENTH
CIRCUIT'S INFERENTIAL APPROACH TO DECIDING INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS
Introduction
In United States v. Cronic, I the Supreme Court unanimously reversed
a Tenth Circuit decision 2 to vacate the defendant's conviction because
he did not have the assistance of counsel guaranteed by the sixth
amendment. 3 The Supreme Court held that counsel are to be presumed
effective. 4 Absent extraordinary circumstances, a defendant may over-
come this presumption only by pointing out specific errors made by
counsel which undermined the adversarial process and prejudiced the
right of the defendant to receive a fair trial.
5
A. Facts
Defendant Cronic and two co-defendants were indicted on thirteen
counts of mail fraud and unlawful use of a fictitious name.6 The indict-
ment charged Cronic and his co-defendants with "kiting" checks worth
over $9,400,000 between banks in Tampa, Florida and Norman,
Oklahoma. The checks were drawn on the accounts of Skyproof Manu-
facturing, Inc., a Florida firm which the indictment alleged was a front
for the check-kiting operation.
7
Cronic and co-defendant Cummings had both retained Levine, a
private attorney, for trial. 8 The attorney withdrew as Cronic's counsel
shortly before the trial date, due to a conflict of interest between Cronic
and Cummings. 9 The trial court appointed new counsel for Cronic.
Cronic stated that he had spoken with the appointed counsel and had
found him helpful, but objected to the appointment because the new
counsel specialized in real estate, had never had a jury trial, and had
1. 104 S. Ct. 2039 (1984). Justice Stevens delivered the opinion for the Court. Jus-
tice Marshall concurred in the judgment without opinion.
2. 675 F.2d 1126 (10th Cir. 1982).
3. The sixth amendment provides, in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be informed on the nature and cause of the accu-
sation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense."
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4. 104 S. Ct. at 2046 (citing Michel v. New York, 350 U.S. 91, 100-01 (1955)).
5. Id. at 2051.
6. 675 F.2d at 1127. The indictments were based on 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982) (mail
fraud) and 18 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982) (unlawful use of fictitious name).
7. 104 S. Ct. at 2042 n.4.
8. Levine had represented Cronic, Skyproofand the co-defendant prior to trial. 675
F.2d at 1129.
9. Id.
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previously handled only one federal criminal case.10 The trial court re-
plied that if Cronic wished to select his own lawyer, he could hire one,
but that his appointed counsel was very bright and had been selected
pursuant to normal screening procedures."I
New counsel requested a continuance of at least thirty days in order
to properly prepare for the trial. Cronic's former counsel, Levine, sup-
ported this request, telling the judge that the new attorney would need
at least thirty days to digest the enormous amount of government docu-
mentation gathered in the case.1 2 The trial court agreed to continue the
case, but only for a period of twenty-five days.
13
The government plea-bargained with Cronic's two co-defendants
and presented their testimony at trial in order to etablish that Cronic
had conceived and engineered the entire check-kiting operation. The
government's evidence at trial included the testimony of seventeen wit-
nesses from four states and the government had access to thousands of
documents collected over a four-year investigatory period.14
Counsel for Cronic put on no defense, but through cross-examina-
tion established that Skyproof was not a sham, but was actually an oper-
ating venture. Cross-examination also established the lack of written
evidence demonstrating that Cronic had any control over Skyproof or
had personally participated in withdrawals or deposits in the bank ac-
counts.15 Cronic did not testify because the trial court ruled that a prior
conviction could be used to impeach his testimony.16 At the conclusion
10. Brief for Appellee at 7, Cronic v. United States, 675 F.2d 1126 (10th Cir. 1982).
Appointed counsel told Cronic that his prior federal criminal practice was limited to "in-
volvement" in one other case. Counsel also told the jury that it was his first trial. 675 F.2d
at 1129 n.2.
11. The trial judge responded to Cronic's objections to the appointment in the fol-
lowing manner:
If you are getting around to saying you want to select your own lawyer, no way.
You have got a good lawyer, and if you want your own, you go hire your own.
This man was appointed under our system. We select qualified lawyers, he's
qualified or I wouldn't have appointed him. He's very bright, and he was ap-
pointed from an alphabetical list all of whom are screened and we just don't do it
any other way in this district.
Brief for Appellee at 23.
12. Levine stated that he was prepared to proceed on behalf of Cummings but that
government documentation was "a foot and a half high, if not two feet high," that it con-
strued "hundreds and hundreds of checks and thousands of entries," and that new counsel
hadn't even seen it. Trial Record of Motion to Withdraw and New Appointment of Coun-
sel,June 19, 1980 at 18, lines 7-9. Levine continued, "I would respectfully submit to your
Honor that if counsel were to devote all of his working days, he might be able to be ready
in 30 days, might be if he were to devote all of his time just to this case." Trial Record of
Motion to Withdraw and New Appointment of Counsel, June 19, 1980 at 18, lines 15-18.
13. 104 S. Ct. at 2041-42; 675 F.2d at 1128.
14. 104 S. Ct. at 2041; 675 F.2d at 1128-29.
15. 104 S. Ct. at 2042-43.
16. Id. at 2042. Before the court questioned Cronic to establish whether he under-
stood that he had the right to testify, the following exchange occurred:
The Court: This young man, Colston, I think has done a tremendous job repre-
senting you.
Cronic: I agree, certainly agree.
The Court: You acted at one time that you weren't happy, but that was earlier
when you hadn't seen him in action.
Cronic: I am certainly glad you overruled me.
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of the four-day jury trial, Cronic was convicted on eleven of the thirteen
counts. He was later sentenced to 25 years imprisonment and fined
$11,000.17
B. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
Cronic appealed on the grounds that he was denied effective assist-
ance of counsel at trial, and that his sentence was based on erroneous
information. 18 Cronic contended that his counsel was completely inex-
perienced in criminal law, that he had never tried a case before a jury,
that he was thrust into a situation that was complex both factually and
legally, that twenty-five days was not enough time to prepare for trial,
that prior to trial Cronic met only once with his counsel, and that his
counsel rarely raised objections during the trial and failed to tender any
jury instructions to the court. 19 Cronic argued that all these factors,
taken as a whole, constituted a denial of effective assistance of counsel.
20
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the government cited Dyer v.
Crisp 21 as establishing in the Tenth Circuit that "[t]he Sixth Amendment
demands that defense counsel exercise the skill, judgment and diligence
of a reasonably competent defense attorney."2 2 The government's con-
tention was that Cronic had not demonstrated that his counsel failed to
meet this standard.
23
The court of appeals stated that United States v. Golub 24 and United
States v. King,25 decided after Dyer, established that "when circumstances
hamper a given lawyer's preparation of a defendant's case, the defend-
ant need not show specified errors in the conduct of his defense in order
to show ineffective assistance of counsel." 2 6 In Golub, the defendant ap-
pealed his mail fraud conviction, claiming he was denied adequate assist-
ance of counsel at trial because his trial attorney had been unskilled in
criminal law and had not had adequate time to prepare the defense.
27
Trial Record of Proceedings on July 14, 15, 16, 17, 1980 at 568.
In his motion for new trial, however, Cronic explained his prior praise of counsel
through an affidavit of a psychologist who indicated he had advised respondent to praise
trial counsel in order to ameliorate the lawyer's apparent lack of self-confidence. 104 S.
Ct. at 2043 n.6.
17. 675 F.2d at 1128.
18. The court of appeals decided the case on the effective assistance issue, and de-
clared the erroneous information issue moot. 675 F.2d at 1128.
19. Reply Brief for Appellant at 5.
20. Reply Brief for Appellant at 3.
21. 613 F.2d 275 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 945 (1980).
22. 613 F.2d at 278. In order to prove ineffective assistance of counsel under the
standard used by the Tenth Circuit prior to the Dyer decision, a defendant was required to
show that the trial was a farce, a mockery of justice, shocking to the conscience of the
court, or that representation was in bad faith, a sham or pretense, or without adequate
time for conferences and preparation. See Gillihan v. Rodriguez, 551 F.2d 1182, 1187
(10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 845 (1977); Johnson v. United States, 485 F.2d 240
(10th Cir. 1973).
23. 675 F.2d at 1128.
24. 638 F.2d 185, 187 (10th Cir. 1980).
25. 664 F.2d 1171, 1172-73 (10th Cir. 1981).
26. 675 F.2d at 1128.
27. 638 F.2d at 188.
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Citing Wolfs v. Britton,28 the Golub court applied the following five factors
to determine whether inadequacy of representation could be inferred
from the surrounding circumstances without proof of specific prejudice
at trial: (1) the time allowed to investigate and prepare; (2) counsel's
experience; (3) the severity of the offenses charged; (4) the complexity
of the defense; and (5) counsel's accessibility to witnesses.2 9 According
to the Golub court, if application of these five criteria indicated that coun-
sel simply had not had sufficient time to prepare for trial, ineffective
assistance of counsel may be inferred by the court.
In King, the defendant was indicted for income tax evasion follow-
ing a three-year investigation. 30 The defendant's attorney withdrew,
and new counsel had twenty-seven days to prepare a defense for a eight-
day trial involving approximately 200 witnesses and 5,000 exhibits. 3 1
After his conviction, King appealed on the grounds that he had ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel at trial due to the lack of time given his counsel
for trial preparation. 32 The Tenth Circuit relied on the factors adopted
in Golub to find a sixth amendment violation without looking to any spe-
cific errors made by counsel at trial.
33
The Tenth Circuit in Cronic enunciated the Golub-King factors, and
in applying them, compared Cronic's case to King.3 4 The only material
difference the court found between King and Cronic was that King was
more complex.3 5 The court noted, however, that "Cronic's case was not
an ideal one for an aspiring criminal defense lawyer to cut his teeth on,"
and that if Cronic's case were simpler than King's, "this advantage was
offset by his appointed counsel's total or near-total lack of relevant ex-
perience."' 36 The court concluded that while an attorney's lack of rele-
vant experience does not inevitably give rise to ineffective assistance of
counsel, the Golub-King criteria required that Cronic's conviction be re-
28. 509 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1975).
29. 638 F.2d at 189. The Tenth Circuit found that although Golub's counsel had
performed adequately at trial, he had not had adequate time to prepare in light of the
complexity of the case, the geographical dispersion of witnesses and his unfamiliarity with
criminal law. Id. at 188-89. Golub's convictions were reversed and a new trial ordered,
but the government filed a motion for rehearing and tendered an affidavit from the trial
court stating Golub had received above average assistance of counsel. Granting the mo-
tion, the Tenth Circuit stayed the motion for new trial and ordered an evidentiary hearing
on whether the performance of Golub's counsel was inadequate, and whether he had been
given adequate time to prepare. The trial judge found the performance adequate and that
'no prejudice resulted from the short preparation time. The Tenth Circuit reviewed these
findings in United States v. Golub, 694 F.2d 207 (10th Cir. 1982), and applied the same
five factors to determine whether the trial preparation time met the constitutional require-
ments. The Tenth Circuit held that Golub failed to show how he had been prejudiced by
the short trial preparation time and that the facts of a particular case must demonstrate
either that the defendant was actually prejudiced by the amount of time allowed for prepa-
ration or that there was a substantial threat of prejudice in order to show a sixth amend-
ment violation. 694 F.2d at 215.
30. 664 F.2d at 1172.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1173.
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versed without finding any specific errors by counsel at trial.3 7
C. The Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the court
of appeals had correctly interpreted the sixth amendment. 3 8 The court
analyzed the sixth amendment by reviewing previous Supreme Court
decisions addressing the right to counsel. The Court reaffirmed the im-
portance of the right to effective counsel,3 9 but held that absent ex-
traordinary circumstances, defendants must point to specific errors
committed by counsel at trial in order to show ineffective assistance.
40
Citing McMann v. Richardson,4 1 the Court stated "[i]t has long been
recognized that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assist-
ance of counsel," 4 2 noting that in previous decisions it has held that the
Constitution guarantees "adequate legal assistance," 4 3 "a fair trial, and
a competent attorney," 4 4 and "counsel acting in the role of advocate."
4 5
According to the Court, the purpose of the constitutional guarantee of
effective assistance of counsel is to assure partisan advocacy on both
sides of a case, and "to assure fairness in the adversarial criminal pro-
cess." 4 6 The Court concluded that "[t]he right to the effective assist-
ance of counsel is thus the right of the accused to require the
prosecution's case to survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial
testing."
4 7
Although the burden is usually on the accused to demonstrate that
specific errors of counsel undermined the reliability of the trial pro-
cess, 4 8 the Court noted that there may be circumstances of such magni-
tude that no specific showing of prejudice is required.49 The Court
cited Powell v. Alabama 50 as a case where the actual performance of
counsel at trial was not examined because under the circumstances, "the
likelihood that counsel could have performed as an effective adversary
was so remote as to have made the trial inherently unfair."'5 1 In Powell,
the defendants, indicted for capital offenses, were represented by a law-
yer appointed on the first day of trial who had no chance to prepare the
37. Id.
38. 104 S. Ct. at 2042.
39. Id. at 2043-44.
40. Id. at 2046, 2051. See also id. at 2047 n.26.
41. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
42. 104 S. Ct. at 2044 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 749, 771 n.14
(1970)).
43. 104 S. Ct. at 2044 (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980)).
44. 104 S. Ct. at 2045 (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 (1982)).
45. 104 S. Ct. at 2045 (quoting Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 743 (1967)).
46. 104 S. Ct. at 2045 (quoting United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1980)).
47. 104 S. Ct. at 2045.
48. Id. at 2046. See also United States v. McDonald, 723 F.2d 1288, 1297 (7th Cir.
1983); Mathews v. United States, 578 F.2d 1245, 1246 (7th Cir. 1975); United States ex rel,
Korval v. Attorney General, 550 F. Supp. 447, 454 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
49. 104 S. Ct. at 2047.
50. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
51. 104 S. Ct. at 2048.
1984]
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case or familiarize himself with local procedure. 5 2
In Cronic, the Supreme Court found that while the Golub-King factors
would be relevant to an evaluation of a lawyer's effectiveness in a partic-
ular case, they did not rebut the presumption that Cronic's counsel was
effective. 53 According to the Court, the Golub-King test could require a
reversal "even if a lawyer's actual performance was flawless."' 54 The
Court stated that neither the amount of time the government spent in-
vestigating the case, nor the number of documents government agents
reviewed during that investigation were necessarily relevant to the ques-
tion of whether a competent lawyer could prepare to defend the case in
twenty-five days. 55 The Court noted that Cronic's only bona fide de-
fense was lack of intent, and that an intent defense was "entirely differ-
ent" from the government's burden of presenting admissible evidence
which would prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 56
Although the government had reviewed thousands of documents
and records, 5 7 the Court reasoned that the government's organization
of these documents and records "simplified the work of defense counsel
in identifying and understanding the basic character of the defendant's
scheme."'5 8 The Court also noted that none of the defense lawyers re-
tained by Cronic had suggested that there was any reason to challenge
the authenticity, relevance or reliability of the government's evidence. 59
The Court also stated that while defense counsel's inexperience
might aid in an evaluation of his actual performance, it did not justify a
presumption of ineffectiveness absent an individual evaluation. 60 Like-
wise, the Court found that while the other factors applied by the court of
appeals may be helpful in evaluating a particular attorney's perform-
ance, they do not identify circumstances which alone or in combination
make it unlikely that Cronic received effective assistance of counsel. 6 '
D. Conclusion
In Cronic v. United States, the Supreme Court flatly rejected the Tenth
Circuit's inferential approach to determining whether the defendant's
right to counsel had been violated. A court may no longer apply the five
factors of Golub and King and infer from those circumstances that the
defendant had not been provided with effective assistance of counsel.
What, then, is the standard? What does Cronic tell us about the
sixth amendment guarantee to assistance of counsel? The Court re-
peated past pronouncements on the subject: the accused is entitled to a
52. Id. at 2047.
53. Id. at 2049.
54. Id. at 2043.




59. Id. at 2050 n.34.
60. Id. at 2050.
61. Id. at 2050-51.
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"reasonably competent attorney." 62 The Court also stated that the
right to effective assistance of counsel is the right of the accused to re-
quire the prosecution's case to survive the "crucible of meaningful ad-
versarial testing." 63 If an actual breakdown of the adversarial process
occurs during the trial, the accused will effectively be denied his funda-
mental sixth amendment right. Generally, there will be no basis for
finding such a breakdown unless the accused can show how specific er-
rors of counsel prejudiced his right to a fair trial and undermined the
reliability of the guilty verdict.
Although it rejected the inferential approach of the Tenth Circuit,
the Court stated that circumstances may exist in a case which are so
likely to prejudice the defendant's right to a fair trial that specific errors
at trial need not be shown. Such circumstances include complete denial
of counsel at a critical stage of the trial, or a complete failure on the part
of defense counsel to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful ad-
versarial testing.
An example of the latter situation arose in Davis v. Alaska,6 4 in which
the accused was denied the right of effective cross-examination. 6 5 The
Court also stated that the sixth amendment right to counsel guarantee
would be violated if surrounding circumstances were to indicate the like-
lihood that any lawyer could provide effective assistance is so small that a
presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into actual con-
duct at trial. 66 The Court cited Powell v. Alabama 67 as a case in which
"[c]ircumstances of that magnitude" were found. 68 As mentioned pre-
viously, the facts and circumstances of Powell can only be considered ex-
treme: The defendants' lawyer was appointed the day of trial in a highly
publicized capital case. Only in the extraordinary case, therefore, may
ineffective assistance be presumed from the surrounding circumstances.
Cronic stands for the proposition that the five Golub-King factors do
not constitute the proper surrounding circumstances for presuming in-
effective assistance of counsel. The five criteria applied by the Tenth
Circuit in Cronic simply "do not demonstrate that counsel failed to func-
tion in any meaningful sense as the Government's adversary."
69
The effect of the Cronic decision will undoubtedly be widespread
and detrimental to criminal defendants. Most certainly, incidences of
new trials granted on the grounds of effective assistance of counsel will
decrease. The convicted defendant will be placed in a position where
she will have to demonstrate specific errors by counsel at trial or con-
vince the court that the surrounding circumstances are of such magni-
tude that ineffective assistance of counsel may be presumed. In the wake
62. Cronic, 104 S. Ct. at 2044 (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. at 770).
63. 104 S. Ct. at 2045.
64. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
65. Id. at 318.
66. 104 S. Ct. at 2047.
67. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
68. 104 S. Ct. at 2047.
69. Id. at 2051.
19841
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of Cronic, establishing circumstances of the proper magnitude may be an
extremely difficult feat.
Cronic opens the door for trial judges to appoint inexperienced
counsel a few days before trial-constitutionally. Such appointments
are now almost sure to pass muster on review. Although the Court sug-
gested in Cronic that it is "entirely possible that . . . courts should exer-
cise their supervisory powers to take greater precaution to ensure that
counsel . . . are qualified,"' 70 no constitutional mandate exists.
Although the potential abuse by trial judges is frightening, there is
also a possibility that trial courts will feel a sense of greater judicial re-
sponsibility after Cronic's green light. Only by making sure that counsel
for the accused is experienced in pertinent areas of the law and has suffi-
cient time to prepare for trial may judges preserve the vitality of the
sixth amendment guarantee to assistance of counsel. The burden also
falls upon the defendant's appellate counsel and the appellate courts to
ensure that the sixth amendment guarantee to assistance of counsel re-
tains its lifeblood. Although defendants and counsel on appeal may no
longer argue that ineffective assistance of counsel can be inferred from
surrounding circumstances, the Golub-King factors are still relevant when
evaluating counsel's actual performance 7 ' and may be cited in order to
buttress claims of specific errors by counsel at trial. Particularly in the
close case, as where an appellate court is confronted with facts less com-
pelling than Powell but more extreme than Cronic, persuasive recitation





70. Id. at 2050 n.38.
71. Throughout the Cronic opinion, the Court states that although no inference of
ineffective assistance of counsel can be drawn from applying the Golub-King factors, these
factors may be relevant when evaluating the attorney's actual performance at trial. See
Cronic, 104 S. Ct. at 2049, 2050 and 2051.
72. The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Robbin Lego in preparing
this article.
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II. McDoNoUGH POWER EQUIPMENT, INc. V. GREENWOOD: SUPREME
COURT LIMITS RIGHT TO NEW TRIAL WHEN JUROR FAILS TO
DISCLOSE DURING VOIR DIRE
In McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood,' the Supreme
Court reversed the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision 2 which had
granted a new trial to the respondent Greenwoods because their right to
peremptory challenge was prejudiced when the jury foreman failed to
answer a voir dire question. The Supreme Court held that in order to
obtain a new trial when a juror gives an incorrect response to a question
on voir dire, a party must show that the question was material, the re-
sponse was dishonest, and that a correct response would have provided
a valid basis for a challenge for cause.
3
A. Background
The case arose out of a products liability action in the District Court
for the District of Kansas. Plaintiffs, Billy Greenwood and his parents,
sued McDonough Power Equipment for damages sustained by Billy
when his foot struck the blades of a riding lawn mower manufactured by
McDonough. 4 During voir dire, plaintiffs' counsel asked prospective ju-
rors the following question:
Now, how many of you have yourself or any members of your
immediate family sustained any severe injury, not necessarily as
severe as Billy, but sustained any injuries whether it was an ac-
cident at home, or on the farm or at work that resulted in any
disability or prolonged pain and suffering, that is you or any
members of your immediate family? 5
Ronald Payton, who later became the jury foreman, did not respond to
this question.
6
After a three week trial, the jury found for the defendant. 7 Shortly
thereafter, the Greenwoods filed a motion with the district court for per-
mission to approach the jury, contending that the jury foreman, Mr. Pay-
ton, failed to disclose that his son had been injured in an accident.8 The
district court denied the motion.9 The following day, the Greenwoods
filed a second motion for permission to approach the jury, and attached
an affidavit from John Greenwood, asserting that as a Navy recruiter,
Mr. Greenwood had reviewed the enlistment application of Payton's
1. 104 S. Ct. 845 (1984).
2. 687 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1982).
3. 104 S. Ct. at 850.
4. Id. at 846. A comprehensive factual recounting can be found in the Tenth Cir-
cuit's decision on remand, Greenwood v. McDonough Power Equipment Co., 731 F.2d
690, 691 (10th Cir. 1984).
5. 104 S. Ct. at 847 (citing Appellate's Brief at 19).
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son, in which Payton's son stated he had been injured when a truck tire
exploded.' 0 The trial court granted the second motion in part, allowing
the plaintiffs to approach Payton for a limited telephone inquiry.''
The same day the motion was partially granted, but before the tele-
phone conference call with Payton, the plaintiffs filed a motion for new
trial alleging 18 grounds for error.1 2 One of these grounds was the trial
court's denial of respondents' motion to approach the jury.13 The trial
court denied the motion. 14 The telephone conference call to Payton
was not made a part of the record, nor were the results of the call re-
ported to the District Court.' 5 The parties' appellate briefs contained
differing versions of the telephone interview.
16
B. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit reversed the case and ordered a new trial.17 In
doing so, it relied on the standard enunciated in Photostat v. Ball.18 In
Photostat, an action arising out of an automobile accident, prospective
jurors misunderstood a voir dire question and unintentionally withheld
information about their involvement in automobile accidents and their
resultant claims. 19 The Tenth Circuit held that the failure of a juror to
fully and truthfully answer questions propounded to the panel is revers-
ible error upon a showing of probable bias of the juror and consequent-
ial prejudice to the unsuccessful litigant.
20
In McDonough, the Tenth Circuit found the unrevealed information
met the "sufficient cogency and significance" test of Photostat, indicating
the probable bias of Payton by suggesting his particularly narrow con-
cept of what constitutes a serious injury.2 1 As the telephone call was not
part of the record, the court of appeals discovered the nature of the
withheld information from reading the different versions of the confer-
ence call in the appellate briefs. 22 The court accepted as true that Pay-
10. 687 F.2d at 341.
11. Id. The district court noted that it was "not overly impressed with the significance
of this particular situation." 104 S. Ct. at 847 (citing Appellate's Brief at 89).
12. 104 S. Ct. at 847.
13. Id.
14. Id. The trial court found "the matter was fairly and thoroughly tried and that the
jury's verdict was a just one, well supported by the evidence."
15. Id.
16. 687 F.2d at 341.
17. Id. at 343.
18. 338 F.2d 783 (10th Cir. 1964).
19. Id. at 784-85.
20. Id. at 787. The information withheld was of"sufficient cogency and significance"
that the court believed counsel was entitled to know of it when he exercised his peremp-
tory challenges.
21. 687 F.2d at 342-43.
22. Id. at 341. The Greenwoods' brief stated that Payton said "it did not make any
difference whether his son had received a broken leg as the result of an exploding tire,"
that "having accidents are a part of life" and that "all his children have been involved in
accidents." McDonough's brief stated that Payton "did not regard (his son's injury) as a
Isevere' injury and as he understood the question (the injury) did not result in any disabil-
ity or prolonged pain and suffering, and that as far as Mr. Payton is concerned, he an-
swered counsel's question honestly, and correctly, by remaining silent." Id.
[Vol. 62:1
VOIR DIRE
ton's concealment of the information was unintentional, but stated that
good faith was irrelevant. 23 The proper standard is whether the average
prospective juror would have disclosed the information, and whether a
correct answer would have been evidence of probable bias on the part of
the juror.
2 4
C. The Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court granted certiorari2 5 to correct the legal standard
applied by the Tenth Circuit. Initially, however, the Court noted that
the Tenth Circuit erred in addressing the merits, as the court of appeals
should have remanded to the district court for a hearing on the new trial
motion.
2 6
Judicial economy was the paramount concern in the Court's rever-
sal of the Tenth Circuit.2 7 The Court, per Justice Rehnquist, indicated
that the Tenth Circuit decision on the merits was outmoded in that it
harkened to an era "when all trial error was presumed prejudicial"
2 8
and reviewing courts were considered "citadels of technicality". 2 9 The
Court reasoned that the financial and temporal costs of trials to parties
and jurors in light of the ever increasing caseload made it impossible to
provide flawless trials for litigants.
3 0
The Supreme Court assessed the Tenth Circuit's ruling in light of
the federal harmless error statute.3 1 Although this statute applies to ap-
pellate courts, it mirrors the harmless error principle of Rule 61 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 32 Both the statute and rule reflect a
movement away from automatic reversal for error, and direct trial courts
23. Id. at 343 (citing Photostat, 338 F.2d at 785).
24. Id.; 104 S. Ct. at 848 n.3.
25. 103 S. Ct. 3109 (1983).
26. 104 S. Ct. at 848 n.3. The Court stated: "in cases in which a party is asserting a
ground for a new trial, the normal procedure is to remand such issues to the district court
for resolution."
The court of appeals had considered the versions of the telephone call to Payton in
the parties' appellate briefs to decide that the unrevealed information met the Photostat
"significance and cogency" test. The Supreme Court found this action by the court of
appeals highly unorthodox, stating "(a)ppellate tribunals are poor substitutes for trial
courts for developing a record or resolving factual controversies." Id.
27. The Court concluded that "[t]o invalidate the result of a three-week trial because
of a juror's mistaken, though honest response to a question, is to insist on something
closer to perfection than our judicial system can be expected to give." Id. at 850. The
standard applied by the Tenth Circuit was "contrary to the practical necessities ofjudicial
management reflected in Rule 61 and § 2111." Id.
28. Id. at 848.
29. 104 S. Ct. at 848 (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 759 (1946)
(quoting Kavanaugh, Improvement of Administration of Criminal Justice by Exercise of Judicial
Power, 11 A.B.A.J. 217, 222 (1925))).
30. Id.
31. 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1982). "On the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in
any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record without regard
to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties." Id.
32. 104 S. Ct. at 849. Rule 61 provides, in pertinent part that "No error.., or defect
in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties
is grounds for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict . . . unless refusal to take
such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every
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to exercise discretion in determining whether the substantial rights of
the parties and the essential fairness of the trial have been impaired.
The Court used the varied responses to the voir dire question to
demonstrate that there is no average juror.3 3 Consistent with the princi-
ples stated in Smith v. Phillips,34 the Court stated that the right of the
parties is to have "an impartial trier of fact." '3 5 By exposing personal
biases, voir dire examination protects that right.3 6 The most important
safeguard in this process is that prospective jurors answer honestly.
37
The Court reasoned that the Greenwoods' substantial rights had not
been impaired because Payton's answer to the question posed during
voir dire, though mistaken, was honest. The Court held that the stan-
dard for a new trial in this situation requires first, a demonstration that a
juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire and, sec-
ond, a showing that a correct response would have provided a valid basis
for challenge for cause. 38 The standard articulated by the Supreme
Court is more stringent than the Tenth Circuit standard. Having dis-
missed the validity of using the probable response of an average juror as
a benchmark, the Court indicated that honesty in answering material
questions is the determinative factor in deciding whether a juror is im-
partial. Furthermore, courts may only grant a new trial when the right
to challenge for cause is impaired, not when the right to peremptory
challenge is impaired.
39
Both concurring opinions attempted to clarify the standard
presented by the majority opinion. Justice Blackmun, joined by justices
O'Connor and Stevens, agreed that the proper inquiry is whether the
defendant had the benefit of an impartial trier of fact; and, that in most
cases, "the honesty or dishonesty" of a prospective juror's answer to a
voir dire question will be "the best initial indicator of the degree of im-
partiality." 40 Blackmun stressed, however, that the decision to grant a
post-trial hearing lies with the trial court's discretion based on factual
circumstances from which bias is demonstrated or inferred.
4 1
stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does
not affect the substantial rights of the parties."
33. 104 S. Ct. at 849-50. Payton's belief that his son's injury was not an injury which
"resulted in any disability or prolonged pain or suffering," id. (citing Appellate's Brief at
19), was contrasted with another juror's belief that her six-year-old son did suffer such an
injury when he caught his finger in a bike chain, and a third juror's initial failure to re-
spond, although her husband had been injured in a machinery accident. The Court rea-
soned that there can be no standard for an "average juror", as they come from varied
backgrounds, and the statutory qualifications for jurors require only a minimal compe-
tency in the English language. Id. at 849 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1865 (1982). Furthermore,
the Court added that "such a standard is difficult to apply and productive of uncertain-
ties." Id. at 850.
34. 455 U.S. 209 (1982).




39. Id. at 850.




Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred with the
judgment based on procedural considerations, 4 2 but wrote to express
his dissatisfaction with the standard adopted by the Court.4 3 Brennan
interpreted the majority opinion to mean that a new trial is never war-
ranted if a juror answers voir dire questions honestly, but incorrectly.
Brennan agreed that the court of appeals applied an erroneous stan-
dard, but felt the inquiry should focus on the bias of the juror and the
resulting prejudice to the litigant. 44 Therefore, Brennan concluded, the
correct standard would require a demonstration that the juror incor-
rectly responded to a material question on voir dire, and a showing that
under the facts and circumstances of the particular case, the juror was
biased against the movant.4 5 Honesty and intent, according to Brennan,
should merely be additional factors for the Court's consideration.
46
Thus, unlike the Tenth Circuit, Brennan felt intent was relevant, but
discounted honesty's importance because it might not indicate implied
bias. 4 7 Because of the possibility of implied bias, Brennan felt a court
should consider two questions: whether there were any "facts in the
case suggesting that bias should be conclusively presumed; and, if not, is




McDonough is another disconcerting example of the Supreme
Court's tendency to decide cases on broader issues than the facts re-
quire. 49 Justices Brennan and Marshall agreed with the majority that
the Tenth Circuit should have remanded the issue of juror bias to the
district court for a hearing rather than deciding it on its merits. 50 The
Tenth Circuit never stated that the district court abused its discretion in
not ordering a new trial, nor did it confine its decision to a review of the
42. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 851.
45. "One easily can imagine cases in which a prospective juror provides what he sub-
jectively believes to be an honest answer, yet that same answer is objectively incorrect and
therefore suggests that the individual would be a biased juror in the particular case." Id.
46. Id.
47. Brennan stated that "the bias of a juror will rarely be admitted by the juror him-
self, 'partly because the juror may have an interest in concealing his own bias and partly
because the juror may be unaware of it' ". 104 S. Ct. at 85! (quoting Smith v. Phillips, 955
U.S. 209, 221-24 (1982)).
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3446-48 (StevensJ., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (Fourth amendment case in which the Court acknowledged
that it could have remanded the case to the court of appeals for reconsideration of the
issue of probable cause in light of Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983), yet voted it was
within its authority to decide the broader question of whether to modify the exclusionary
rule and, subsequently, reverse the court of appeals.); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784
v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2595-2610 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The District Court's
action was a preliminary injunction reviewable only on an abuse of discretion standard; the
Court treated the action as a permanent injunction and decided the merits, even though
the District Court had not yet had an opportunity to do so." Id. at 2596.).
50. 104 S. Ct. at 848 n.3; id. at 851 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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motion under the information available to the district court for its deci-
sion. The district court was in no position to exercise its discretion on
the issue ofjuror bias, because the results of the telephone conversation
with Payton were never reported to it. 5 1 Both appellate courts based
their rulings on the assumption that Payton incorrectly answered a voir
dire question. In fact, there is no indication in the record that the an-
swer was incorrect. The courts relied on the parties' briefs to conclude
that Payton gave an honest but incorrect answer.
52
The Supreme Court recognized that a motion for a new trial is com-
mitted to the discretion of the trial court and that the Tenth Circuit
should have remanded the case to the district court for a hearing on
Payton's non-disclosure. 53 Despite this criticism, the Supreme Court as-
serted a new standard without any record of the facts in controversy.
On remand, the Tenth Circuit followed the Supreme Court's new rule
and ignored its criticism, dismissing the claim based on Greenwood's
counsel's statement that Payton believed his answer was honest.
54
Thus, the issue in McDonough was appealed all the way to the United
States Supreme Court, remanded to the Tenth Circuit, and then dis-
missed without any finding of the underlying facts.
The Supreme Court's new standard is, however, clearer and more
objective than the tests announced by the Tenth Circuit in Photostat. It
promotes judicial economy by reducing the chance that courts grant
new trials due to insignificant mistakes in voir dire. Although the
Supreme Court did not expressly overrule Photostat, it in effect accom-
plished as much. To obtain a new trial under McDonough a party must
show that a correct and honest response would have provided a valid
basis for challenge for cause. Because this standard is far more stringent
than the Photostat test, the right to peremptory challenge has been se-
verely limited. Ironically, the Supreme Court chose to limit this right in
the interests of judicial economy in a case which should have been re-
manded to the district court at the appellate level based on procedural
considerations.
Susan H. Klann
51. The Greenwoods contend that their efforts to make a more extensive post-trial
record were "thwarted" and that "this was specifically pointed out to counsel for McDon-
ough by one of the circuit judges at oral argument." Petition in Opposition to Certiorari
at 15.
52. 104 S. Ct. at 848 n.3; 687 F.2d at 341.
53. The Court noted that "appellate tribunals are poor substitutes for trial courts for
developing a record or resolving factual controversies." 104 S. Ct. at 848 n.3.
54. 731 F.2d 690 (1984).
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III. FINAL SCORE: BOARD OF REGENTS 3, NCAA 0-SUPREME COURT
AFFIRMS TENTH CIRCUIT'S FINDING THAT NCAA TELEVISION
PLAN CONSTITUTED RESTRAINT OF TRADE
A. Introduction
In National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of the Univer-
sity of Oklahoma, ' the Supreme Court upheld the Tenth Circuit's ruling 2
that the 1982-85 television plan of the National Collegiate Athletic Asso-
ciation (NCAA) for broadcasting its members' football games 3 violated
section 1 of the Sherman Act. 4 More significant than the majority's
holding that the plan constituted a horizontal restraint of trade,5 how-
ever, was its application of the rule of reason 6 and its refusal to apply the
per se rule.
7
Antitrust litigants, already confused by the Supreme Court's recent
inconsistent application of the per se rule, 8 will view the NCAA decision
as further evidence of the Court's retreat from its "hardline" application
of the per se rule in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society. 9 Maricopa,
NCAA, and National Society of Professional Engineers v. United Statest ° were
all authored by Justice Stevens. In MaricopaJustice Stevens relied on per
se analysis, while in NCAA he clearly rejected the rule's applicability. In
Professional Engineers, although Justice Stevens did not state the rule on
1. 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984) [hereinafter NCAA].
2. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983).
3. There are 850 colleges and universities within the NCAA, divided into Divisions I,
II and III. 187 out of the 276 members in Division I have football teams. Divisions II and
III have smaller sports programs but vote on all matters, including approval of the football
television plans. 104 S. Ct. at 2954.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) provides: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."
5. 104 S. Ct. at 2971.
6. The rule of reason, first suggested in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,
85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), affid, 175 U.S. 211 (1899), examines the surrounding circum-
stances which gave rise to the presumption of illegality to determine if the questioned
business behavior is anticompetitive and violative of the antitrust laws. The classic adop-
tion of the rule of reason appears in Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1
(1911).
7. The per se rule classifies certain categories of business behavior as antitrust viola-
tions without inquiring into circumstances surrounding the activity. The rationale behind
the rule is that certain behaviors have been identified as anticompetitive with such regular-
ity that analysis is no longer necessary to arrive at a decision as to its legality. This is so
even if there are instances in which the rule is unfairly applied. See United States v. Topco
Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150
(1940); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
8. Justice White refused to apply the per se rule in a case of apparently straightfor-
ward price-fixing in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1
(1979). Three years later, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 351 (1982), stated that once activity has been charac-
terized as price-fixing, there is no room for balancing procompetitive effects; the per se
rule must be applied.
9. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
10. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
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which he relied, he apparently used the rule of reason.I1  These three
opinions, particularly NCAA, reflect the increasingly limited reliance on
the per se rule in antitrust analysis.
This comment analyzes the Supreme Court's distinction between
the per se rule and the rule of reason in examining the NCAA's alleged
antitrust violations. As the Supreme Court has previously noted, the
distinction between the two rules may not be critical. Under either rule,
one evaluates the competitive effects of the restraint. 12 This comment
suggests, however, that while abandonment of the per se rule appears to
be consistent with the Court's decision in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, 13 it may have been unnecessary in this case. The
NCAA decision also illustrates the Court's increasing use of the Chicago
school's' 4 efficiency theory in analyzing alleged antitrust violations. The
comment concludes by discussing the problems inherent in this method
of antitrust analysis.
B. Background
For the past eight decades the NCAA, an unincorporated, non-
profit, educational association, has exerted almost complete regulatory
control over the sports programs of its member colleges and universi-
ties.' 5 There is little disagreement that most of the policies imple-
mented by the NCAA have not only enhanced intercollegiate sports
programs but have also been essential to such programs' existence.16 A
challenge to that consensus arose, however, in regard to the NCAA's
control over the sale of television rights to football.
17
11. In Professional Engineers, the Court moved away from reliance on the "price-fixing"
element as proof of a per se violation. The Court's inquiry, however, was a limited appli-
cation of the rule of reason insofar as it only examined the anticompetitive impact of the
restraint; the Court seemed reluctant to weigh procompetitive impacts.
12. If the restraint is clearly and always anticompetitive, the practice is banned under
the per se rule. If it is less clearly anticompetitive, the restraint may be either labelled
anticompetitive or procompetitive after analysis under the rule of reason. As Justice Ste-
vens stated in National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, "In either event, the
purpose of the analysis is to form a judgment about the competitive significance of the
restraint .... " 435 U.S. at 692.
13. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
14. The Chicago school is a group of economists who favor a strict economic ap-
proach to antitrust analysis. Under this theory microeconomics provides the foundation
for interpretation of the antitrust laws. See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY
AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978). For an analysis of the Chicago school and, in particular,
Judge Posner's disregard for objectives other than promotion of efficiency through compe-
tition, see Comment, Changing Configurations of Antitrust Law: Judge Posner's Applications of His
Economic Analysis to Antitrust Doctrine, 32 DE PAUL L. REV. 839, 882-96 (1983).
15. The NCAA was founded in 1905. "The NCAA, in short 'exist[s] primarily to en-
hance the contribution made by amateur athletic competition to the process of higher
education as distinguished from realizing maximum return on it as an entertainment com-
modity.' " NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2972 (WhiteJ, dissenting) (quoting Association for Inter-
collegiate Athletics for Women v. NCAA, 558 F. Supp. 487, 494 (D.C. 1983), afd, 735
F.2d 577 (D.C.'Cir. 1984).
16. These policies include the regulation of recruiting and the establishment of stan-
dards for academic eligibility. 707 F.2d at 1153.
17. Football is the only area of amateur intercollegiate sports in which the NCAA has
attempted to regulate television rights. 104 S. Ct. at 2954.
378 [Vol. 62:1
NCAA v. BOARD OF REGENTS
In 1951, based on studies by the National Opinion Research
Center, the NCAA decided it was necessary to limit the number of tele-
vised football games in order to protect live attendance.' 8 This goal was
accomplished by a series of plans in which the NCAA sold exclusive tele-
vision rights. 19 In 1981, the NCAA adopted a plan for 1982-1985 which
awarded television rights to ABC and CBS. 20 The heart of the NCAA's
plan was the payment of a recommended fee 2 ' by the networks to each
member school for the right to televise its games. Importantly, the
amount any team received for such rights bore no relationship to the
size of the viewing audience or any particular feature of a game or
team.2 2 A much anticipated game between two prominent schools re-
ceived the same fee as a game which attracted a far smaller audience.
This fact was crucial to the Supreme Court's finding that the plan was
anticompetitive.
2 3
Dissatisfied with the television plans, in 1979 a small group within
the College Football Association (CFA) 24 began to push for a greater
voice in the creation of television policy for those schools with major
football programs. When the CFA signed its own contract with NBC in
August 1981, the NCAA threatened sanctions. In September, 1981, the
CFA brought suit charging that the NCAA's control unreasonably re-
strained the trade of televising college football.
2 5
18. The accuracy of the studies has been questioned. The district court found
NCAA's reliance on the studies "either an ill-founded belief at best or, at worst, a decep-
tion employed to make the majority of the NCAA membership believe that they should
control football television out of self interest." Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla. v.
NCAA, 546 F. Supp 1276, 1296 (W.D. Okla. 1982).
As the Supreme Court noted, the concern is not about protecting attendance at games
that are televised, but that fan interest in games shown on television may adversely affect
ticket sales for games which are not televised. The Court stated, however, that the evi-
dence simply did not lead to such a finding. Statistics from the 1984 college football sea-
son support the Court's conclusion. Although the NCAA decision resulted in a
tremendous expansion in the number of Division IA games broadcast on network and
cable television during 1984, live attendance at Division IA games actually increased over
the 1983 pre-decision figures. In 1984, 25,783,807 spectators attended 606 Division IA
games, for an average of 42,548 per game. In 1983, 25,381,761 spectators attended 602
games, for an average of 42,162 per game. Telephone interview with representative of
NCAA Statistics Department, Shawnee Mission, Kansas (Jan. 15, 1985).
19. The television plans were approved by referendum votes of the NCAA's member-
ship from 1952-1977. After 1977, the members voted only on the "Principles of Negotia-
tion" which purportedly formed the basis of the plans. 546 F. Supp. at 1283.
20. 104 S. Ct. at 2956.
21. A representative of the NCAA set fees based on the different types of telecasts
(e.g., national or regional). Id.
22. Id.
23. "Price is higher and output lower than they would otherwise be, and both are
unresponsive to consumer preference." 104 S. Ct. at 2963-64.
24. The CFA is an unincorporated voluntary association formed in June 1977. At the
time the Supreme Court heard NCAA, the CFA was composed of 61 institutions of higher
learning that had indicated commitments to major college football.
25. The CFA also obtained a preliminary injunction to prevent the NCAA from inter-
fering with its contract with NBC. The effect of NCAA's threats, however, was sufficient to
cause the CFA-NBC arrangement to fail. 546 F. Supp. at 1286-87.
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C. District Court Decision
In a thorough decision,2 6 Judge Burciaga, sitting by designation in
the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma,
held that the football television controls constituted a horizontal re-
straint of trade, a group boycott, and a monopoly in the market of col-
lege football. 2 7 Demonstrating the current uncertainty regarding
reliance on the per se rule, the district court held that the television plan
violated section 1 of the Sherman Act 28 when examined under either the
per se rule2 9 or the rule of reason.
3 0
The decision purported to lay to rest numerous contentions raised
by the NCAA as to the inappropriateness of applying antitrust sanctions
to a voluntary association. The NCAA argued that membership in the
NCAA was voluntary and therefore plaintiffs could withdraw from the
association if they were unhappy with the plan. The district court dis-
agreed. Forming a rival group was "neither practical, feasible nor desir-
able," 3' and, furthermore, plaintiffs wanted to remain in the NCAA.
Therefore, the district court found that relief under the antitrust laws
was appropriate.
The district court also labeled as "cavil" the NCAA's argument that
college football was not a business and therefore merited a different
type of antitrust analysis.3 2 The district court noted that the purpose of
the NCAA's television controls was to maximize football revenues of its
member schools, and that the NCAA was very much a business, free to
maximize revenues as long as the means were legal.3 3 The court also
dismissed the NCAA's argument that it did not possess market power.
Defining the relevant market as live college football, 34 the court found
the NCAA exercised monopoly power in that market.
The district court began its two-part analysis with a restatement of
three principles which it apparently believes are unchallenged: first, that
the intent of the Sherman Act is to preserve unrestrained economic
competition;3 5 second, that it is for Congress and not the courts to de-
26. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276 (W.D. Okla.
1982).
27. Both the district court decision and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decision
are described in greater detail in the Antitrust section of the Tenth Annual Tenth Circuit
Survey (June 1, 1982-May 31, 1983), 61 DEN. L.J. 135 (1984). In particular, the reader is
'eferred to that article for careful analysis of the Tenth Circuit's opinion. This comment
focuses on the Supreme Court's review of that decision with respect to the application of
the per se rule and the rule of reason, and with respect to the Court's reliance on output
restriction theory.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
29. 546 F. Supp. at 1311, 1313.
30. Id. at 1319.
31. The district court reasoned that, "[a]s a practical matter, membership in the
NCAA is a prerequisite for institutions wishing to sponsor a major, well-rounded athletic
program." Id. at 1288.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1288-89.
34. Id. at 1297.
35. This belief is based, in turn, on the principle that unrestrained competition yields
the greatest good for society. Id. at 1304. See, Northern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356
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termine if competition is the wisest policy for a specific industry or if it
may, in fact, be ruinous;3 6 and third, that price fixing, group boycotts
and horizontal agreements among competing sellers to limit the availa-
bility of a product are unreasonable per se.
3 7
The court based much of its analysis on Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Co-
lumbia Broadcasting System. 38 In Broadcast Music, the Supreme Court re-
jected the per se rule in spite of the presence of all the outward signs of
traditional price fixing.3 9 In NCAA the district court demonstrated lit-
eral price fixing on the part of the NCAA and held that a finding of
literal price fixing does not automatically result in per se illegality.
40
The district court in NCAA found it necessary to inquire whether the
restraint increased efficiency and rendered the market more competi-
tive. Until this point in the decision, the district court appeared to be
following the Supreme Court's rejection in Broadcast Music of the third
principle which the district court had regarded as unchallenged-that
horizontal agreements limiting product availability and price fixing are
illegal per se.
The district court, however, then distinguished the NCAA television
restraint from the blanket license in Broadcast Music on several
grounds. 4 1 The district court also dismissed the NCAA's argument re-
garding the restraint's procompetitive features by reference to Arizona v.
Maricopa County Medical Society, 4 2 wherein the Court held that the per se
U.S. 1 (1958). For a strong attack on the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Sherman
Act to protect existing enterprises to the exclusion of social objectives and an attack on the
Court's reliance on the "myth of cost supremacy over value," see Curran, Antitrust and the
Rule of Reason: A Critical Assessment, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 745 (1984). See generally Bork, The
Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965),
suggesting that "the sole appropriate value in this field of antitrust is the maximization of
consumer want satisfaction," id at 781. For a thorough analysis of contrary views, for
example, see Justice Peckham's rule of reason analysis in United States v. Trans-Missouri
Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 390 (1897). Justice Peckham, as Judge Bork points out, believed the
goals of the Sherman Act could properly include the social and political as well as the
economic well-being of the nation.
36. 546 F. Supp. at 1304 (citing National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States,
435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)). Traditionally, if competition appears to be disastrous to an
industry, the industry applies to Congress for a statutory exemption from the antitrust
laws.
37. 546 F. Supp. at 1304. See supra note 7.
38. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
39. In Broadcast Music, the defendants issued nonexclusive blanket licenses entitling
licensees to use of the member composers' works. The Court determined that the blanket
licenses would not always reduce output and restrict competition. The licensing was simi-
lar to the NCAA plan insofar as a single fee was charged with no relation to, for example,
the number of times the composition would be used. The Court found not only that the
restraints should not be accorded per se treatment but that they were likewise reasonable
under the rule of reason.
40. 547 F. Supp. at 1305.
41. The grounds include: (1) in Broadcast Music a federal law had granted composers
the right to copyright, and a market arrangement to protect a federally-created right did
not logically appear to be a violation of the antitrust laws; (2) individual composers were
free to make their own deals in spite of the blanket licensing; and (3) the arrangement in
Broadcast Music was a necessary means of marketing the composers' work. Similar consid-
erations were not found in ACAA. Id.
42. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
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rule applied in spite of procompetitive justifications. 4 3 Thus, unlike the
Supreme Court in Broadcast Music, the district court did not find ade-
quate grounds for rejecting the per se rule.
Having concluded that the television plan was a per se violation of
the Sherman Act, the district court nevertheless proceeded to analyze
the television plan under the rule of reason. Considering only the plan's
impact on competitive conditions, 44 the court found the plan's contribu-
tion to the legitimate non-commercial goals of the NCAA was minimal
and indirect. The district court found the clear and overriding effect of
the plan was the suppression of competition in the marketing of games
for television viewing. Furthermore, the court found no procompetitive
benefits to offset or justify such anticompetitive restraints.
4 5
D. The Court of Appeals Decision
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's two-part
analysis in finding that the plan constituted a Sherman Act violation
under either the per se rule or the rule of reason.4 6 The Tenth Circuit
held fast to the Supreme Court's reasoning in Professional Engineers4 7 that
noneconomic considerations cannot justify restraints that adversely af-
fect competition, and added that even if such a justification was legiti-
mate, any contribution to athletic balance by the NCAA's plan could be
achieved by less restrictive means. 4 8 It found that, on its face, the televi-
sion plan restricted output. 49 The Court of Appeals noted that in some
circumstances ancillary restraints5 0 will escape the per se rule.5 1 It
found in this case, however, that the NCAA television plan was not "an-
43. Id. at 351.
44. 546 F. Supp. at 1314. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States,
435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978), which states:
The Rule of Reason. .. has been used to give the [Sherman] Act both flexibility
and definition, and its central principle of antitrust analysis has remained con-
stant. Contrary to its name, the Rule does not open the field of antitrust inquiry
to any argument in favor of a challenged restraint that may fall within the realm of
reason. Instead, it focuses directly on the challenged restraint's impact on com-
petitive conditions.
45. The district court specifically found that the controls did not protect gate attend-
ance as claimed or preserve a competitive balance among the schools. 546 F. Supp. at
1319.
46. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983). The court also affirmed the district court's
grant of standing and reversed its finding that the controls constituted a per se group
boycott.
47. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
48. 707 F.2d at 1154.
49. Id. at 1156. Output restriction is one approach to assessing efficiency. It is used
widely by those who contend the sole purpose of the antitrust laws is to promote efficiency
and consumer welfare. See Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 COR-
NELL L. REV., 1140 (1981). The Court of Appeals concluded that there was a decrease in
output based on the drop in viewership that accompanied the plan. 707 F.2d at 1153-54.
The Supreme Court stated that "[b]y restraining the quantity of television rights available
for sale, the challenged practices create a limitation on output." 104 S. Ct. at 2960.
50. A restraint is considered ancillary only when "[t]he parties [are] cooperating in an
economic activity other than the elimination of rivalry, and the agreement must be capable
of increasing the effectiveness of that cooperation and no broader than necessary for that
purpose." 707 F.2d at 1153 (quoting R. BORK, THE AwrNImusT PARADOX 279 (1978)).
51. 707 F.2d at 1152-53 n.6.
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cillary to the rulemaking integration" because it did not increase the effi-
ciency of the integration and was broader than necessary to achieve the
procompetitive goals.
5 2
E. The Supreme Court Opinion 53
NCAA presented the Supreme Court with the opportunity to ad-
dress the confusion surrounding the application of the per se rule and
the rule of reason. It also afforded the Supreme Court the opportunity
to determine the reasonableness of the alleged ancillary restraint by ex-
amining the nature, purpose and history of the television plan.
Although addressing many of these issues throughout its opinion, the
Court confined itself to a very narrow holding based primarily on the
Chicago school's output-restriction approach.
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens noted that some restraints
are necessary to preserve amateur collegiate sports. Thus, rule of rea-
son analysis was required to determine whether the challenged restraint,
which appeared to violate the antitrust laws, actually enhanced competi-
tion. 54 In other words, the Court looked at the nature of the institution
and decided that application of the per se rule was inappropriate. The
Court conceded that the NCAA's agreement among competitors as to
how they compete was the type of horizontal restraint which has often
been presumed unreasonable.5 5 The Court, however, elected not to ap-
ply the per se rule, reasoning that some horizontal restraints are neces-
sary if the product is to be made available. 5 6 Moreover, the Court made
clear that the basic thrust of the inquiry under either test is essentially
the same-to determine the impact of the restraint on competitive con-
ditions.5 7 In this respect it is consistent with the lower court decisions.
Examining the effects of the NCAA restraints, the Court found that
price was higher and output lower than they would be under normal
market conditions. 58 It determined that both price and output were un-
responsive to consumer preference, and thus the restraints failed to
meet a primary goal of the Sherman Act.5 9 Addressing the NCAA's as-
52. Id. at 1154.
53. NCAA, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
54. Id. at 2969.
55. Id. at 2959. Such restraints, limiting output and price fixing, are usually held to be
illegal per se. Id. at 2960. The per se rule has traditionally been applied in spite of the
occasional reasonableness of a restraint because of the probability that most restraints will
be anticompetitive. The rule itself, in order to preserve judicial economy, precludes con-
sideration of factors which may prove to have procompetitive effects.
56. The Court specifically stated it did not base its decision on lack of experience with
this type of restraint or the NCAA's nonprofit status. Id. The Court thus took upon itself
to inquire into the characteristics of the college football industry. It described the "vital
role" the NCAA plays in preserving the character of college football and enabling "a prod-
uct to be marketed which might otherwise be unavailable." Id. at 2961.
57. 104 S. Ct. at 2960 & n.21.
58. Id. at 2963-64.
59. Id. (citing Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979), which viewed the
Sherman Act as a "consumer welfare prescription"). "A restraint that has the effect of
reducing the importance of consumer preference in setting price and output is not consis-
tent with this fundamental goal of antitrust law." 104 S. Ct. at 2964.
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sertion that the plan could not have an anticompetitive effect because it
lacked market power, the Court noted that absence of proof of market
power did not justify naked restrictions on price or output. 60 Further-
more, as the District Court so painstakingly demonstrated, the NCAA
did possess market power.6 1 The Supreme Court thus concluded that
the effect of the NCAA's restraint upon the operations of the market
placed a heavy burden on the NCAA to present an affirmative defense
that justified the restraint.
6 2
At this point the Supreme Court, distinguishing the facts before it
from those in Broadcast Music, held that the NCAA television plan did not
enhance competitiveness or produce any "procompetitive efficiencies"
to prevent it from being found in violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act. 6 3 The Court made short shrift of the NCAA's concern with protect-
ing live attendance. In addition to the fact that the record indicated the
plan simply did not protect live attendance, the Court noted that it could
not accept a justification based on the fear that the product itself might
not attract enough customers.64 Furthermore, the Court agreed with
the district court that the television restraints did not help maintain
competitive balance and that, if the restraints were removed, many more
games would be televised in a free market.
6 5
F. The Dissent
Justice White,joined by Justice Rehnquist, maintained that the tele-
vision plan was not fundamentally different from the other "anticompet-
itive" aspects of NCAA self-regulation such as fixing the number of
coaches, regulating recruitment and determining the number of games
to be played. Justice White attacked the majority as being caught up in
"commercial antitrust rhetoric and ideology."' 6 6 His primary disagree-
ment was with the majority's finding that the plan had a substantial an-
ticompetitive effect. First, Justice White specifically disagreed with the
idea that output should be measured by the number of televised games.
Rather, the Justice maintained, output should be measured by the size of
the actual television audiences; the Justice found that audience size was
actually enlarged by the plan.6 7 Second, he charged that respondents
failed to prove that it was the reduction in the number of televised
60. 104 S. Ct. at 2965.
61. Id. at 2965-67.
62. Id. at 2967. The effect, as previously noted, was to raise price and reduce output.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 2968-69. See also supra note 18.
65. Id. at 2970.
66. Id. at 2974 (White, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 2975. CompareJustice White's dissent, which deplores the majority's mea-
surement of price and output and proposes that the measure is not the reduction of games
shown locally and regionally but the increase in total audience as a result of greater net-
work coverage, with Judge Logan's statement in the Tenth Circuit's opinion: "We doubt
on its face the argument that the output may be properly characterized as viewership
... . An argument that total viewership is enhanced by restricting the sale of broadcast-
ing rights is speculative." 707 F.2d at 1154.
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games that increased the price.68 Traditionally, reductions in the mar-
ket result in higher prices for the same product. Justice White argued,
however, that the NCAA had created a new product (exclusive television
rights) that was more valuable than games marketed individually.
69
Third, he found the redistribution of revenues a "wholly justifiable, even
necessary" aspect of the intercollegiate athletic system.
70
Justice White also argued that the NCAA's program of self-regula-
tion was "essentially noneconomic."' 7 1 He attacked the Tenth Circuit's
and the district court's view that Professional Engineers7 2 precluded reli-
ance on policy considerations when analyzing a restraint's impact on
competition. 73 Finally, the Justice attempted to distinguish Professional
Engineers based on the fact the engineers were engaged in "standard,
profit-motivated commercial activities," as contrasted with the "primar-
ily noneconomic values pursued by educational institutions."
' 7 4
G. The Consequences of the Majority's Decision
The Supreme Court's NCAA decision immediately evoked wide-
spread speculation that it spelled disaster for smaller colleges and would
lead to the demise of college football. 7 5 Justice White's concern that the
television plan was part of the "essentially noneconomic" regulation of
collegiate sports and should not be examined by the same antitrust crite-
ria applied to business enterprises has been echoed by many
sportspersons.
The Supreme Court, however, arrived at the only conclusion as to
the anticompetitive effects and nature of the plan that would be consis-
tent with the Court's prior interpretation of the Sherman Act. It was
clear to the Court, regardless of the general defensibility of restrictions
on college sports, that the NCAA's television plan interfered with the
schools' basic freedom to sell their games at whatever price obtainable.
Justice Stevens effectively answered every attempt by the NCAA to jus-
68. 104 S. Ct. at 2975-76 (White, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 2976. The Justice suggested that the price rise might more properly be
attributable to the increase in output. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2977.
72. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
73. 104 S. Ct. at 2978 (White, j., dissenting). The lower courts based this view on
language in Professional Engineers that the purpose of antitrust analysis "is to form a judg-
ment about the competitive significance of the restraint; it is not to decide whether a policy
favoring competition is in the public interest, or in the interest of the members of an
industry." 435 U.S. at 692.
74. 104 S. Ct. at 2978 (White, J., dissenting).
75. See, e.g., Taaffee, The Supreme Court's TV Ruling: Will the Viewer Benefit Most, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, July 9, 1984, at 9. Taaffee worried that, although the Court theoretically
"established an open market in which the schools could peddle their games indepen-
dently," the decision had actually created chaos in which the "only certainty is that college
football is going the way of college basketball, with games proliferating all over the dial."
Id. at 9. He also expressed the widespread fear that the decision meant that the TV net-
works and a handful of top schools would be better off financially, but that the less prestig-
ious schools were bound to suffer. Id
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tify the restraint and portray itself as incapable of violating the antitrust
laws.
It is unclear, however, whether it was necessary for the Supreme
Court to reject the per se rule in evaluating the anticompetitive effects of
the television plan. The Court's decision to apply the rule of reason was
based on the Court's recognition that other horizontal restraints were
necessary in the college football industry. None of the NCAA's other
restraints, however, involved price fixing, a restraint to which procom-
petitive justifications have not traditionally been allowed. 76 Arguably,
the Court could have held, regardless of the fact some restraints en-
hanced competition within the NCAA, that the restraint's price fixing
effect clearly distinguished the television plan and justified a finding that
it automatically violated the Sherman Act. This analysis would have
been consistent with Justice Steven's 1982 Maricopa7 7 opinion.
The NCAA decision, which moves away from the per se rule and
toward the rule of reason, is consistent, however, with the decisions in
Broadcast Music, Professional Engineers, and Continental T. V. v. GTE Sylva-
nia.78 Perhaps the Supreme Court chose to apply the rule of reason not
because the anticompetitive effects of the plan were unclear, but because
the Court felt that application of the per se rule to the NCAA, a volun-
tary association, would be inherently unfair. 79 The rule of reason, how-
ever, was not created by the courts as a way to avoid Sherman Act
liability, but as a method of evaluating anticompetitive effects when a
restraint clearly does not interfere with the freedom to make such funda-
mental decisions as to whom and at what price to sell. As pointed out
again by Judge Burciaga in October, 1984,80 the NCAA clearly coerced
76. But see Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1 (1979),
holding that an apparent case of price fixing resulting from a blanket licensing agreement
should not be treated as a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
77. 457 U.S. 332 (1982). See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
78. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). In Sylvania, the Court held that non-price vertical restrictions
should be analyzed under the rule of reason. The Court further held that such vertical
restrictions could contemporaneously reduce intrabrand competition and have a beneficial
effect on interbrand competition.
79. The Court noted that it is Congress, not the Courts, that must create exemptions
to the antitrust laws. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. Thus the Court's applica-
tion of the rule of reason may have been a response to its inability to carve an antitrust
exemption for the NCAA. See also Note, Antitrust and Nonprofit Entities, 94 HARV. L. REV. 802
(1981). The note criticizes the courts' failure to arrive at a systematic application of anti-
trust concepts to associations (such as amateur athletic associations) which are concerned
primarily with objectives other than the maximization of profits. The note maintains that
the only justification for "anticompetitive" practices is solving market failures. In a purely
competitive market, education and amateurism would not be supplied, as they would not
coincide with profit-maximizing goals.
80. Board of Regents v. NCAA, 601 F. Supp. 307 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 31, 1984) (memo-
randum opinion partially granting defendant's amended motion to modify the court's
judgment). Any misgivings about the application of the antitrust laws to voluntary associa-
tions such as the NCAA will be allayed by a reading of Judge Burciaga's memorandum
opinion. The opinion makes very clear that no evidence was presented to the court dem-
onstrating a " 'voluntary' relinquishment" of television rights by members. Id. at 310.
The court also sharply reprimanded the NCAA for its persistence in trying to test the
court's resolve and attempting to "reimpose the very activity this Court, as well as the
appellate courts, have found to be illegal." Id. at 310.
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member schools into assigning their rights to telecast football games
and interfered with their freedom to decide to whom and at what price
to sell those rights. In light of such obvious anticompetitive conduct, it
does not seem possible that any surrounding circumstances could justify
such a restraint. It seems clear that Justice Stevens should have applied
per se analysis.
In addition, the Supreme Court's reliance on the Chicago school's
efficiency theory may also have been unnecessary. The Court held it was
the television plan's limitations on output (and the subsequent harm to
consumer welfare) that violated the Sherman Act.8 ' There are, how-
ever, three problems with the Court's formulation. First, given the in-
conclusiveness of the statistics presented regarding television audience
and stadium attendance, the Court's reliance on a statistical approach
which measures anticompetitive effect in terms of numbers of televised
games and their effect on live gate attendance is subject to criticism.
8 2
There are numerous factors that go into game attendance, only one of
which is television programming. Factors such as weather conditions,
the closeness of conference standings, and other contemporaneous
events occurring in the community also have a direct effect on a fan's
decision to attend a college football game.
Second, the Court did not have to rely solely on output-restriction
theory to find a violation of the Sherman Act. The output-restriction
test is not the only method of evaluating the efficiency of a restraint.
Focusing on the enhancement of the competitive process itself, regard-
less of economic statistics, 8 3 the Court could have found that the mere
elimination of individual schools from the competitive process violated
the Sherman Act. Indeed, the Court noted in its opinion that one of the
anticompetitive effects of the plan was that "[i]ndividual competitors
lose their freedom to compete."8 4 The Court in its holding, however,
ignored this simple and direct effect on the competitive process among
the schools themselves and held that it was the curtailment of output
and effect on consumer preference that violated the Sherman Act.8 5
Third, the opinion notes that the district court did not find that the
81. "Today we hold only that the record supports the District Court's conclusion that
by curtailing output and blunting the ability of member institutions to respond to con-
sumer preference," the NCAA has violated the Sherman Act. 104 S. Ct. at 2971.
82. See supia notes 18 and 67. Justice White criticized the majority's measurement of
output in terms of the number of televised games. The Justice, however, simply would
have substituted another measure of output and thus does not go beyond the output-
restriction model of the majority.
83. See Fox, supra note 49 at 1169. Ms. Fox soundly rejects the view that antitrust
should be limited to efficiency objectives. Id. at 1178.
84. 104 S. Ct. at 2963. In admitting harm to individual competitors, the Supreme
Court began to move away from the school of thought that believes antitrust law is only
rightfully concerned with harm to competition, not harm to competitors. See generally
Schwartz, 'Justice" and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076 (1979).
Schwartz objects to "the dogma that the antitrust laws protect 'competition not competi-
tors,' because the goals ofjustice and the antitrust laws sometimes demand protection of
competitors." Id. at 1076.
85. Id. at 2971. See also note 81 for a direct quotation of the Court's holding.
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television plan "produced any procompetitive efficiencies. ' 8 6 This im-
plies that if the plan had increased output and reduced price, the inquiry
would have gone no further and the restraint would have been allowed.
If this were the case, the other goals of antitrust law such as protection
against concentration of economic power, protection of the process of
competition in itself and the promotion of justice would be rendered
useless.
87
This is not to say that efficiency has no place in antitrust analysis; 88
however, it is only one antitrust goal, not the exclusive one. Antitrust
also restrains entities such as the NCAA from abusing their market
power 8 9 and protects individual competitors such as the member NCAA
schools in their ability to freely compete in the television market.
These other goals were inadvertently met as a result of the Supreme
Court's NCAA decision. The NCAA is being restrained from coercing its
member schools to market their football games through the NCAA's
plan. The Supreme Court's formulation of its-holding solely in terms of
output-restriction theory and effect on consumer welfare, however, was
unnecessarily narrow. The Court, although aware of the plan's violation
of the spirit of the antitrust laws, felt compelled to rely on modern effi-
ciency theory as the basis of its holding. As discussed above, this ap-
proach unfortunately moves the Court toward a narrow economic-based
theory of antitrust analysis.
Christine O'Connor
86. 104 S. Ct. at 2967.
87. "This conception of antitrust would prohibit almost nothing at all ......
[E]conomic analysis keyed solely to 'efficiency' and 'consumer welfare' has revealed with
stark simplicity that there will be very little remaining of antitrust.' " Fox, supra note 49, at
1145-46 (quoting Rowe, New Directions in Competition and Organizational Law in the United
States, in ENTERPRISE LAW OF THE 80's, at 177, 201 (Rowe, Jacobs & Joelson eds. 1980)).
88. See Fox, supra note 49, for an excellent analysis of other approaches to the mea-
surement of efficiency, approaches which incorporate some of the other goals of antitrust.
89. See Schwartz, supra note 84. Schwartz finds clear evidence of congressional pur-
pose to create procedural protection for competitors which "serves the very useful role of
preventing abuse of power when the growth of power cannot be checked." Id. at 1076.
Schwartz sees a clear congressional exercise of "supervision over fair procedure and jus-
tice in economic relationships" in a number of areas of business. Id. at 1079. For exam-
ple, Schwartz points to banking regulation as "subordinat[ing] 'efficiency' considerations
to considerations of excessive concentrations of power when it seeks to prevent banks and
bank holding companies from extending their operations into 'non-banking' business."
Id. at 1077.
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